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I   INTRODUCTION 
The Australian suburban landscape is dotted with homes, schools and other 
buildings made from asbestos cement sheeting. Most Australians have more than 
a passing contact with ‘fibro’ and a sentimental fondness for its unpretentious 
simplicity. Australians were amongst the largest consumers of asbestos products 
and the James Hardie group was the largest Australian manufacturer. However, 
exposure to asbestos may result in fatal diseases which do not become manifest 
for decades. In view of this long latency period, compensation claims for 
asbestos related disease in Australia will continue for many years. 
The James Hardie group ceased asbestos operations in 1987 because of these 
health concerns and rising compensation claims. It later developed a substitute 
building product – fibre cement without asbestos – which enjoys spectacular 
success especially in United States markets where the group generates the bulk of 
its revenue and its management is located. By the late 1990s, the group’s future 
seemed bright, dampened only by what management saw as ‘legacy issues’ 
arising from compensation claims from its earlier Australian asbestos operations. 
Through litigation, Hardie had effectively quarantined legal liability for 
compensation in the two wholly-owned subsidiaries that had conducted the 
group’s asbestos operations. Removing these subsidiaries from the group would, 
it thought, assist it to raise funds more easily in United States capital markets 
where investor sensitivity to asbestos liabilities had hindered the group’s earlier 
capital raising attempt. So began a complex corporate restructuring.  
On 15 February 2001 the board of directors of the parent company (‘James 
Hardie’ or ‘Hardie’) approved a management proposal to transfer ownership of 
the two subsidiaries to a foundation which it created to hold them and process 
future asbestos claims. The Hardie board approved the transfer and agreed to 
make some modest further payments to the foundation since the subsidiaries did 
not then have positive net worth after taking account of likely future asbestos 
claims.1 The company informed the stock exchange that the foundation had 
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‘sufficient funds’ to meet all legitimate compensation claims anticipated from 
people injured by asbestos products manufactured by the former subsidiaries, 
thus providing ‘certainty for both claimants and shareholders.’2 
It quickly became apparent, however, that the resources of the foundation and 
the subsidiaries would be exhausted in a relatively short time. Hardie refused the 
foundation’s persistent requests for supplementary funding. When the 
foundation’s parlous finances became known, the issue became one of wide 
community concern. A Special Commission was appointed to inquire into the 
restructure. When the hearings were well advanced, Hardie accepted that the 
foundation had been very significantly underfunded. Indeed, the Commissioner 
found that the net present value of likely asbestos-related claims in future years 
was about $1.5 billion and the foundation’s net assets a mere $179.2 million.3 
During the public hearings probing the adequacy of the foundation’s funding, 
Hardie came under intense public pressure to accept greater responsibility for 
claims and towards the close of the hearings, it responded by proposing a limited 
compensation scheme.4 It later negotiated an agreement with the New South 
Wales Government to contribute up to 35 per cent of its annual net operating 
cash flow to a statutory compensation fund, until 2045 (although the term may be 
extended if needed). The agreement was approved by Hardie shareholders and 
lenders. It is undoubtedly the largest corporate settlement reached in Australia. 
There are clear indications that Hardie directors perceived themselves as 
constrained by the law on directors’ duties in any disposition they might have to 
contribute to compensation for asbestos victims especially in view of their 
litigation strategy of quarantining liabilities in the former subsidiaries. Through 
the long restructuring process, Hardie directors were advised by external lawyers 
‘that directors could not provide … “more than that for which [the parent 
company] was legally responsible, without honestly believing that … what [they] 
were doing was of benefit to [its] shareholders.”’5 When the inadequacy of the 
foundation’s funding became clear, Hardie justified its refusal to contribute on 
the grounds that ‘there can be no legal or other legitimate basis on which 
                                                                                                                         
1  New South Wales, Special Commission of Inquiry into the Medical Research and Compensation 
Foundation, Report (2004) vol 1, 162 [11.51] (‘Jackson Report’). For these payments, the foundation 
indemnified the parent company against liability under any asbestos claims that might be made against it: 
at 331 [21.6], 530–3 [28.8]–[28.16]. See further Gideon Haigh, Asbestos House: The Secret History of 
James Hardie Industries (Scribe Publications, 2006); Matt Peacock, Killer Company: James Hardie 
Exposed (HarperCollins, 2009).  
2  James Hardie Industries Limited, ‘James Hardie Resolves its Asbestos Liability Favourably for Claimants 
and Shareholders’ (Media Release, 228763, 16 February 2001) <http://www.asx.com.au/asx/statistics/ 
 announcements.do> quoted in Jackson Report, 29 [2.35]. Civil penalty proceedings were commenced 
against the non-executive directors for breach of their duty of care in approving the release. The Supreme 
Court of New South Wales made declarations of contravention, civil penalty orders and disqualification 
orders which were later set aside by the Court of Appeal. In May 2012, the High Court allowed appeals 
from that decision, setting aside the substantive orders made by the appellate court: Australian Securities 
and Investments Commission v Hellicar [2012] HCA 17. 
3  Jackson Report, above n 1, 7 [1.2].  
4  Ibid 559 [30.27]. 
5  Ibid 196 [14.45(d)] (testimony of chair of the James Hardie board). 
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shareholder’s [sic] funds could be used to provide additional funds to the 
Foundation and the duties of the company’s directors would preclude them from 
doing so.’6 The chair of the James Hardie board later referred to the ‘immense 
difficulty, … [and] immense complexity’7 involved in adjusting conflicting 
expectations upon directors. Their understanding of available options reflected 
the legal advice the Hardie directors received on their duties from a first-tier law 
firm. It is reasonable to assume that such advice is given regularly in Australian 
boardrooms in similar contexts.  
Through the restructure James Hardie sought to distance itself from 
responsibility for the health effects of the past asbestos operations of the group, a 
measure contrary to the interests of external stakeholders such as employees and 
others suffering or yet to suffer asbestos-related diseases. Its plan was defeated 
by community and political pressure grounded in a social consensus of rare 
intensity as to the impropriety of Hardie’s refusal to accept responsibility. The 
incident directly raises the relationship between corporate social responsibility 
and directors’ duties. The argument of this article is that the legal duty of 
Australian directors to act in the best interests of their company does not give 
directors clear guidance as to how they may or should respond to the myriad 
social norms and expectations that are powerful and generally beneficial 
moderators of corporate conduct. Further, the article argues that Australian law 
gives directors insufficient licence to respond to these norms in circumstances 
where doing so is not clearly to the financial benefit of their company. Whilst 
business practice appears to be shaped by the wider norms, the James Hardie 
incident indicates the inhibiting effect that directors’ duties may have when the 
response to social expectation is or may prove to be profit sacrificing.  
Part II looks at the web of social norms, expectations and sanctions that bear 
upon corporations. Part III examines the scope of permissible director regard for 
stakeholder interests under Australian law and the guidance and protection 
Australian law gives directors in situations like those in Hardie where voluntary 
assumption of responsibility for its social harms is profit or shareholder welfare 
sacrificing. Parts IV to VI sketch some reform options including an explicit 
discretion for directors to respond to negative social impacts and stakeholder 
expectations despite profit sacrifice. 
 
II   CORPORATE RESPONSES TO SOCIETAL EXPECTATIONS  
Modern business operates within a milieu of social norms and expectations 
with respect to its conduct and relationships. Two distinct groups of norms are 
especially significant – those referred to as norms of corporate social 
responsibility and norms of responsibility for the human rights impacts of 
                                                 
6  Ibid 557 [30.22] citing James Hardy Industries NV, ‘Possible Asbestos Funding Shortfall Suggests 
Significant Change in Claims’ (Media Release, 29 October 2003). 
7  Fiona Buffini, ‘Calls to Protect Corporate Conscience’, The Australian Financial Review (Canberra), 23 
November 2005, 4. 
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business operations and relationships. Both rely upon business self-restraint 
grounded in enlightened self-interest.  
 
A   Corporate Social Responsibility 
1 The Meanings of Corporate Social Responsibility  
While definitions abound,8 corporate social responsibility (‘CSR’) is, in 
sophisticated modern conceptions, understood as ‘the responsibility of 
enterprises for their impacts on society’.9 The term CSR is sympathetically used 
to refer to a range of voluntary measures undertaken by companies to integrate 
social, environmental and business concerns in their operations and their 
interaction with stakeholders.10 Stakeholders are variously defined as those with 
an interest in or dependence relationship with the company or those upon whom 
the company depends for its survival. They include, in addition to shareholders, 
employees, creditors, customers, suppliers, local communities or the wider 
community from which the corporation draws support. CSR represents a form of 
enlightened management practice, voluntarily adopted and extending beyond 
legal obligation because it is seen as being in the long-term interest of the 
corporation and its shareholders. A leading Australian practitioner describes CSR 
as ‘rational, enlightened and self-interested business behaviour’.11 In its strongest 
form it is not an optional add-on but is fully integrated into and shapes all aspects 
of corporate operations.  
This dominant form of CSR has the advantage of enabling companies to 
manage the considerable non-financial risks of their operations; it also enables 
them to meet wider community expectations with respect to their conduct and to 
protect their ‘social licence to operate’. CSR initiatives protect firm goodwill or 
brand name and intangible assets that generally comprise a major part of the 
balance sheet of any corporation dealing in public product, services or investment 
markets. CSR also offers the prospect of strategic social or ethical differentiation 
from competitors and broad legitimacy in consumer and investor markets and 
society generally. 
 
2 The Norms and Sanctions of Corporate Social Responsibility  
The modern CSR movement is an apparent paradox – a self-imposed 
discipline assumed by firms that forgoes some of globalisation’s freedoms. CSR 
initiatives have proliferated over the past two decades and it is unusual for a 
major corporation from a developed country not to have adopted a policy that 
                                                 
8  Alexander Dahlsrud, ‘How Corporate Social Responsibility is Defined: An Analysis of 37 Definitions’ 
(2008) 15 Corporate Social Responsibility and Environmental Management 1. 
9  European Commission, ‘A Renewed EU Strategy 2011–14 for Corporate Social Responsibility’ 
(Communication No 681, European Commission, 25 October 2011) 6. 
10  See, eg, Commission of the European Communities, ‘Corporate Social Responsibility: A Business 
Contribution to Sustainable Development’ (Communication No 347, Commission of the European 
Communities, 2 July 2002) 5–8.  
11  Westpac, Submission No 94 to Parliamentary Joint Committee on Corporations and Financial Services, 
Inquiry into Corporate Responsibility, September 2005, 15. 
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addresses the negative social and environmental impacts of its operations and 
those of its supply chain. Most major firms and industries have now promulgated 
codes of responsible behaviour. It has been estimated that more than 3000 global 
firms issue reports on their social and environment performance and that there 
are more than 300 industry or product codes.12 Corporate social responsibility is 
‘the tribute that capitalism everywhere pays to virtue.’13 
In these instruments, firms make voluntary commitments dealing with labour 
standards and working conditions, respect for human rights, social and 
environmental impacts and corruption avoidance. Codes range from initiatives by 
individual firms, industries and sectors, to those created with wider stakeholder 
input and some with the further legitimacy of government participation. Other 
voluntary instruments cover reporting, compliance and verification. These 
commitments go beyond the firm’s legal obligations; indeed, that is their 
ostensible purpose – to signify commitment to standards beyond those required 
by the legal systems of the countries in which they operate. They create a vast 
governance network of voluntary obligation, or ‘soft law’, embracing most 
industries and sectors of global business. This is not CSR as philanthropy but 
rather CSR as avoidance of social and environmental harm and responsiveness to 
the expectations of stakeholders and the sanctions that may accompany breach.14 
CSR’s origins were national but the movement has flourished under modern 
economic globalisation in response to instances of demonstrated governance 
failure in the global economy.15 Although voluntary, CSR is socially and 
economically driven. The pressures to which firms respond are based on social or 
market-based sanctions, not legal. Code adoption reflects the advocacy capacity 
of civil society organisations, especially with the ‘naming and shaming’ leverage 
of global communications technology, to hold firms to standards of conduct. 
They draw upon the sanctions of concerned consumers, socially responsible 
investors, and pension funds and other investors also concerned with non-
financial risk in long-term investment. Civil society organisations are typically 
non-profit with a values-based agenda; often they form part of transnational 
advocacy networks, ‘activists beyond borders’,16 partners in the ‘NGO-industrial 
                                                 
12  David Vogel, ‘The Private Regulation of Global Corporate Conduct’ in Walter Mattli and Ngaire Woods 
(eds), The Politics of Global Regulation (Princeton University Press, 2009) 151, 158. 
13  Clive Crook, ‘The Good Company’, The Economist (online), 20 January 2005 
<http://www.economist.com/node/3555212>; see also Doreen McBarnet, ‘Corporate Social 
Responsibility Beyond Law, Through Law, For Law – The New Corporate Accountability’ in Doreen 
McBarnet, Aurora Voiculescu and Tom Campbell (eds), The New Corporate Accountability: Corporate 
Social Responsibility and the Law (Cambridge University Press, 2007) 10–11 (‘the institutionalisation of 
corporate social responsibility as a business issue’). 
14  See David Vogel, The Market for Virtue: The Potential and Limits of Corporate Social Responsibility 
(Brookings Institution Press, 2005) 17–24. 
15  See Paul Redmond, ‘International Corporate Responsibility’ in Thomas Clarke and Douglas Branson 
(eds), The SAGE Handbook of Corporate Governance (SAGE Publications, 2012) 588–90. 
16  See generally Margaret E Keck and Kathryn A Sikkink, Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in 
International Politics (Cornell University Press, 1998). 
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complex’,17 and occupy one corner of a ‘governance triangle’ with firms and 
states in this network of international civil regulation.18 The limits of effective 
civil society advocacy define the contours of the reputational risk to which CSR 
responds.19 While these sanctions are uneven and contingent, for most firms CSR 
is not a wholly voluntary add-on to business strategy.  
 
B   Corporate Responsibility to Respect Human Rights 
The United Nations ‘Protect, Respect and Remedy’ framework for business 
and human rights includes the principle that all business firms have a 
responsibility to respect the human rights of those affected by the firm’s 
activities.20 The framework was developed because of recurrent human rights 
abuses arising in the liberalised trading and investment regimes of the global 
economy. Business operations or supply relationships confront situations where 
there is a divergence between the licence effectively available in host states and 
the social expectations of the firm’s consumers, investors and home state 
communities. These problems are ubiquitous and not confined to large 
international firms; ‘few companies today … do not confront human rights 
problems’.21 
The corporate responsibility to respect human rights does not derive directly 
from international law but from the assumption of responsibility by business 
                                                 
17  See generally Gary Gereffi, Ronie Garcia-Johnson and Erika Sasser, ‘The NGO-Industrial Complex’, 
Foreign Policy (Online), 1 July 2001 
<http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2001/07/01/the_ngo_industrial_complex>. 
18  See generally Kenneth W Abbott and Duncan Snidal, ‘Strengthening International Regulation Through 
Transnational New Governance: Overcoming the Orchestration Deficit’ (2009) 42 Vanderbilt Journal of 
Transnational Law 501. 
19  Redmond, above n 15, 595–600. 
20  John Ruggie, Protect, Respect and Remedy: A Framework for Business and Human Rights, UN GAOR, 
8th sess, Agenda Item 3, UN Doc A/HRC/8/5 (7 April 2008) 9 [24] (‘Business and Human Rights 
Report’). The other principles of the framework are the duty upon state parties to human rights 
instruments to protect against breaches by third parties (including business corporations) and the need for 
more effective access to remedies. The ‘Protect, Respect and Remedy’ framework is the most recent in a 
series of initiatives by the United Nations to identify standards of corporate responsibility for global 
business: Paul Redmond, ‘Transnational Enterprise and Human Rights: Options for Standard Setting and 
Compliance’ (2003) 37 International Lawyer 69, 96–102. The corporate responsibility is to respect 
internationally recognised human rights understood, ‘at a minimum’, as those expressed in the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights and the International Labour Organisation’s Declaration on Fundamental Principles and 
Rights at Work: Business and Human Rights Report, UN Doc A/HRC/8/5, 15–6 [52]–[53]. The 
responsibility applies independently of the host state’s particular human rights commitments. 
21  Sir Geoffrey Chandler, ‘Keynote Address: Crafting a Human Rights Agenda for Business’ in Michael K 
Addo (ed), Human Rights Standards and the Responsibility of Transnational Corporations (Kluwer Law 
International, 1999) 40. 
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itself.22 According to the principal architect of the framework and erstwhile 
Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General on Business and Human 
Rights, the responsibility is grounded in social norms and social expectations that 
have acquired ‘near-universal recognition by all stakeholders, including 
business’23 so that the notion that companies possess human rights 
responsibilities is ‘recognized by virtually all voluntary initiatives companies 
have undertaken, and … stipulated in several soft law instruments’.24 The 
corporate responsibility is to respect the human rights of those affected by the 
firm’s activities: ‘[this] essentially means not to infringe on the rights of others – 
put simply, to do no harm’;25 it applies to all companies in all situations. The 
responsibility includes both legal obligations and social norms and expectations: 
failure to meet this responsibility can subject companies to the courts of public 
opinion – comprising employees, communities, consumers, civil society, as well 
as investors – and occasionally to charges in actual courts. Whereas governments 
define the scope of legal compliance, the broader scope of the responsibility to 
respect is also defined by social expectations – as part of what is sometimes called 
a company’s social license to operate.26  
The responsibility to respect is a specific, non-discretionary norm to be 
distinguished from voluntary initiatives subsumed under the broad umbrella of 
CSR; it has greater normative force as part of the international human rights 
system and sharper definition in the content of its norms. The two concepts share 
a foundation in sensitivity to social expectation and, from a firm and investor 
perspective, long-term risk management.  
 
III   THE SCOPE OF DIRECTORS’ DISCRETION TO RESPOND 
TO SOCIETAL EXPECTATIONS OF CORPORATE CONDUCT  
Does Australian law on directors’ duties permit directors to respond to social 
expectations of responsible corporate conduct? Or, do the CSR movement and 
the corporate responsibility to respect human rights grind against corporate law 
                                                 
22  Business and Human Rights Report, UN Doc A/HRC/8/5, 8 [23]. Ruggie cites as examples the 
International Labour Organisation’s Tripartite Declaration of Principles concerning Multinational 
Enterprises and Social Policy, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development Guidelines 
on Multinational Enterprise, the United Nations Global Compact and company codes as instances of firm 
collaboration in international voluntary standards that evidence acceptance of these norms of 
responsibility. 
23  John G Ruggie, ‘Remarks by SRSG John G. Ruggie Public Hearings on Business and Human Rights 
Sub-Committee on Human Rights European Parliament’, (Remarks delivered at the European Parliament, 
Brussels, 16 April 2009) < http://www.ohchr.org>. 
24  John G Ruggie, ‘Business and Human Rights: A Political Scientist’s Guide to Survival in a Domain 
where Lawyers and Activists Reign’ (Remarks delivered at the Annual Conference International Law 
Association (British Branch), London, 17 May 2008) < http://www.ila-hq.org/en/branches/british-
branch/british_branch_2008.cfm>.  
25  Business and Human Rights Report, above n 22, 9 [24]. 
26  John Ruggie, ‘Mandate of the Special Representative on the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational 
Corporations and Other Business Enterprises’ (Preliminary Work Plan, UN Human Rights Council, 10 
October 2008) 3. 
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norms like giant tectonic plates? The UN Guiding Principles on Business and 
Human Rights, elaborating the ‘Protect, Respect and Remedy’ framework, 
suggest as much, asserting that the implications of corporate and securities laws 
for human rights ‘remain poorly understood’ and that ‘there is a lack of clarity in 
corporate [law] … regarding what companies and their officers are permitted, … 
to do regarding human rights’ and in their guidance on respect for human 
rights.27 James Hardie’s lawyers advised directors that their duties set limits to 
any generosity they might wish to extend to victims of their subsidiaries’ 
asbestos operations (see above, p 318). If directors were found to have been too 
generous and breached their duties, they would be personally liable to 
compensate the company for loss suffered; directors would be unable to protect 
themselves by seeking prior judicial relief and might hope only for ex post 
relief.28 What then is the state of Australian law on the issue? 
 
A   The ‘Unconfirmed Regulatory Consensus’ on Permissible Regard for 
Stakeholder Interests 
An ‘unconfirmed regulatory consensus’29 exists in the Australian legal and 
regulatory community on the tolerable regard that directors may extend to 
stakeholder interests.30 This consensus rests on a very modest doctrinal 
foundation, little of recent origin; it is, however, a widely and confidently shared 
professional and regulatory opinion. The consensus is that directors may have 
regard for non-shareholder stakeholder interests within some uncertain limits, but 
not independently of consequential corporate benefit.31 This consensus is 
‘unconfirmed’ since it does not rest on explicit legislative direction or 
authoritative judicial decision: these questions have simply not arisen directly in 
a modern case coming before an Australian court for decision. The case law on 
the directors’ duty to act bona fide for the benefit of the company as a whole has 
been almost entirely concerned with the exercise of power by directors for 
corporate control manipulation or other self-interested motives or purposes.32 The 
scope of directors’ discretion to consider and act by reference to social 
expectations or a stakeholder’s interest, without personal benefit, has not been 
specifically addressed.  
                                                 
27  John Ruggie, Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations 
‘Protect, Respect and Remedy’ Framework, UN GAOR, 17th sess, Agenda Item 3, UN Doc A/HRC/17/31 
(21 March 2011) 8. 
28  Edwards v Attorney-General (2004) 60 NSWLR 667. 
29  Bryan Horrigan, Corporate Social Responsibility in the 21st Century: Debates, Models and Practises 
Across Government, Law and Business (Edward Elgar, 2010) 203. 
30  For simplicity’s sake this paper refers to directors only. However, the term is used here to include those 
senior managers who owe the same general law and statutory duties as directors. 
31  See, eg, R P Austin, H A J Ford and I M Ramsay, Company Directors: Principles of Law and Corporate 
Governance (LexisNexis Butterworths, 2005) 281–2 [7.13]; Commonwealth, The HIH Royal 
Commission, The Failure of HIH Insurance (2003) vol 1, 118–9; CAMAC, ‘The Social Responsibility of 
Corporations’ (Report, Australian Government, 2006) 111–13 [3.2] (‘Social Responsibility of 
Corporations Report’).  
32  See, eg, Mills v Mills (1938) 60 CLR 150; Whitehouse v Carlton Hotel Pty Ltd (1987) 162 CLR 285. 
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1 The Structure of the Directors’ Duty to Act in the Best Interests of the 
Company  
There is a long-standing general law duty upon directors expressed in the 
formulary that they must act bona fide for the benefit of the company as a 
whole.33 This formulary comprises three distinct but related duties: a subjective 
duty of good faith, that is, to act honestly in the company’s interests as the 
directors perceive them; a duty to exercise powers for a proper purpose; and a 
duty to consult and act by reference to interests that the law recognises as the 
‘interests of the company’.34 The general law duties are supplemented by duties 
in similar terms contained in the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth): directors must 
exercise their powers and discharge their duties in good faith in the best interests 
of the company and for a proper purpose.35 These duties are expressed to apply in 
addition to the general law duties (section 185) but have been interpreted as 
expressing the older general law doctrines.36 Both the general law and the 
statutory duties are owed to (and enforceable by) the company, the corporate 
entity, and not, save in exceptional circumstances, by individual shareholders.37 
By long tradition, courts are reluctant to interfere with directors’ business 
decisions and to substitute their assessments; the tradition acknowledges the 
limitations of judicial capacity.38  
The general law and statute also impose duties of care and diligence upon 
directors: Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), section 180(1). For directors to enter into 
an arrangement with an outsider without any consequential corporate benefit 
would ordinarily breach the duty of care. However, the issue of when and to what 
extent directors may consider and promote outsider interests is determined under 
the duty of good faith and its statutory complement in section 181(1). That duty 
is accordingly the present focus.  
 
2 Whose Interests Are the ‘Interests of the Company’? 
It is the duty of directors ‘to consult [the company’s] interests and its interests 
alone’ in their decisions.39 In Australia, the principal statement is the 1953 High 
Court decision in Ngurli v McCann, a decision concerning a director’s exercise of 
the share issue power to retain voting control of the company.40 The court quoted 
with approval from the judgment of Evershed MR in Greenhalgh v Arderne 
Cinemas Ltd, a case concerning the alteration of the corporate constitution:  
the phrase, ‘the company as a whole,’ does not (at any rate in such a case as the 
present) mean the company as a commercial entity as distinct from the corporators. 
                                                 
33  See, eg, Ngurli Ltd v McCann (1953) 90 CLR 425. The term ‘general law’ is used here to refer to the 
rules and principles of the common law and equity; see also Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 9. 
34  Austin, Ford and Ramsay, above n 31, 264–308. 
35  Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 181(1). 
36  Austin, Ford and Ramsay, above n 31, 265–7 [7.2]. 
37  Percival v Wright [1902] 2 Ch 421. 
38  See, eg, Howard Smith Ltd v Ampol Petroleum Ltd [1974] 1 NSWLR 68, 77; Darvall v North Sydney 
Brick & Tile Co Ltd (1989) 16 NSWLR 260, 281.  
39  Walker v Wimborne (1976) 137 CLR 1, 7 (Mason J). 
40  (1953) 90 CLR 425, 438–9 (Williams ACJ, Fullagar and Kitto JJ). 
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It means the corporators as a general body. That is to say, you may take the case of 
an individual hypothetical member and ask whether what is proposed is, in the 
honest opinion of those who voted in its favour, for that person’s benefit.41  
This statement identifying the company’s interests with the welfare of 
shareholders as a collective body has been described judicially as an ‘obscure and 
incomplete guidance to the interests.’42 Recently, in The Bell Group Ltd (in liq) v 
Westpac Banking Corporation (No 9), Owen J further qualified the statement by 
Evershed MR’s: 
This does not mean that the general body of shareholders is always and for all 
purposes the embodiment of ‘the company as a whole’. It will depend on the 
context, including the type of company and the nature of the impugned activity or 
decision. And it may also depend on whether the company is a thriving ongoing 
entity or whether its continued existence is problematic. In my view the interests 
of shareholders and the interests of the company may be seen as correlative not 
because the shareholders are the company but, rather, because the interests of the 
company and the interests of the shareholders intersect. ...  
[I]t does not follow that in determining the content of the duty to act in the 
interests of the company, the concerns of shareholders are the only ones to which 
attention need be directed or that the legitimate interests of other groups can safely 
be ignored.43 
It is not clear whether Owen J was referring only to the interests of creditors 
in a situation of actual or threatened insolvency where it is well established that 
directors must take account of creditor interests although they are not necessarily 
paramount.44 
Master of the Rolls Evershed excluded from consideration the interests of the 
company as a commercial entity. However, as the parenthetical words indicate, 
this exclusion was in the specific context of a shareholder resolution to amend 
the constitutional contract between members, an issue solely concerning their 
membership interests and not raising any question of benefit of the company as a 
commercial entity. Different considerations apply when directors are exercising 
management oversight and operational powers and wider interests are engaged. 
Indeed, there is some recognition of the claims of the company as a commercial 
entity where directors’ decisions are reviewed. Thus, in Darvall v North Sydney 
Brick & Tile Co Ltd Hodgson J said that ‘it is proper [for directors in a contested 
takeover] to have regard to the interests of the members of the company, as well 
as having regard to the interests of the company as a commercial entity.’45 Other 
authority permits directors to consider the interests of future shareholders, 
balancing them against those of present shareholders;46 the interests of future 
shareholders may cogently be seen as a proxy for the interests of the entity itself 
                                                 
41  [1951] Ch 286, 291. 
42  Kirwan v Cresvale Far East Ltd (in liq) (2002) 44 ACSR 21, 56 (Giles JA). 
43  (2008) 39 WAR 1, 534. 
44  Ibid 544–5; Kinsela v Russell Kinsela Pty Ltd (in liq) (1986) 4 NSWLR 722, 730 (Street CJ). 
45  (1987) 12 ACLR 537, 554; affirmed in Darvall v North Sydney Brick & Tile Co Ltd (1989) 16 NSWLR 
230. 
46  Gaiman v National Association for Mental Health [1971] Ch 317, 330 (Plowman J); see also Provident 
International Corp v International Leasing Corp Ltd [1969] 1 NSWR 424, 440; Darvall v North Sydney 
Brick & Tile Co Ltd (1987) 12 ACLR 537, 554. 
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to continuity and growth. The meaning of the ‘interests of the company’ for 
solvent companies, so integral to the scope of legitimate board response to social 
expectation, remains elusive and context dependent but appears to signify 
something more than the interests of the existing body of shareholders from time 
to time. No Australian case, however, appears to have held directors in breach of 
duty for considering only the short-term interests of current shareholders. 
The question of the scope of legitimate regard for outsider interests has arisen 
in cases on ex gratia payments to employees. Payments to current employees of a 
going concern present no great difficulty in view of likely corporate benefit; at 
least if they are reasonable in quantum.47 It is in relation to payments to former 
employees and their families,48 or to employees on the cessation of company 
operations, that difficult issues arise. In Parke v Daily News Ltd,49 a newspaper 
publisher sold its two newspapers resulting in the disposal of substantially all of 
its assets and the redundancy of most employees. The directors proposed to apply 
the balance of the sale money as ex gratia payments to redundant workers. A 
minority shareholder’s challenge to the payment was upheld:  
The view that directors, in having regard to the question what is in the best 
interests of their company, are entitled to take into account the interests of the 
employees, irrespective of any consequential benefit to the company, is one which 
may be widely held. ... But no authority to support that proposition as a 
proposition of law was cited to me; I know of none, and in my judgment such is 
not the law.50 
The authority of these ex gratia payment cases is clouded by uncertainty as to 
whether the decisions were made under the ultra vires doctrine rather than 
directors’ duties. The ultra vires doctrine in its application to corporations formed 
under Australian companies legislation was abolished from the mid-1980s.51 
 
3 What Nexus is Required Between Social Responsibility Expenditures and 
Corporate Benefit? 
Australian law does not appear to impose on directors a duty to maximise 
profits and shareholder wealth despite the language of the statutory obligation to 
act in ‘the best interests of the company’.52 A leading text concludes that 
directors may ‘implement a policy of enlightened self-interest on the part of the 
company but [they] may not be generous with company resources when there is 
no prospect of commercial advantage to the company.’53 The requirement of 
consequential corporate benefit from expenditures upon others is clearly stated in 
                                                 
47  Hampson v Price’s Patent Candle Co (1876) 45 LJCh 437. 
48  See, eg, Re Lee Behrens & Co Ltd [1932] 2 Ch 46.  
49  [1962] Ch 927, 962 (‘Parke v Daily News’). 
50  Parke v Daily News [1962] Ch 927, 962 citing Hutton v West Cork Railway Co (1883) 23 Ch D 654, 671. 
51  Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 124(2). 
52  J D Heydon, ‘Directors’ Duties and the Company’s Interests’ in P D Finn (ed), Equity and Commercial 
Relationships (Law Book Company, 1987) 120, 134–5. 
53  Austin, Ford and Ramsay, above n 31, 281–2 [7.13].  
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the ex gratia employee payments cases but is expressed in other contexts also.54 
A parliamentary committee expressed the nexus in terms of the directors’ 
purpose of gaining a benefit for the company.55 Other commentators suggest that 
the main legal restriction on directors’ discretion is that ‘there be the possibility 
of some eventual return to shareholders which justifies a departure from short-
term profit maximization’.56 What is unclear is what commensurability, 
proportionality or balance, if any, is required between corporate expenditure and 
benefit. It is on this question that the Australian consensus becomes especially 
unclear. Although it is widely assumed that Australian law on directors’ duties 
requires that stakeholder interests must pass through the eye of the needle of 
shareholder value, the question is not addressed specifically in judicial decision 
concerning companies which are not insolvent or facing the immediate threat of 
insolvency. 
Consider the significance of this issue for the James Hardie restructure. If 
Hardie’s businesses were entirely operated in Australia, the voluntary provision 
of funding to meet the shortfall in the asbestos subsidiaries’ resources might have 
been unproblematic since it would be matched by a significant reputational boost 
for the company. However, with only 15 per cent of its revenue derived in 
Australia, and the company’s future even more firmly directed offshore, the 
derivative benefit to the company might be disproportionate to that provided to 
Australian asbestos victims. When James Hardie ultimately agreed to the 
compensation settlement, its agreement was subject to approval by its 
shareholders. Presumably, this was done because of stock exchange listing rules 
in view of the size of the commitment made in the settlement, rather than because 
its entry would involve breach of duty by the directors requiring shareholder 
ratification and forgiveness. Such ratification was not sought in the shareholder 
resolution. Although no shareholder challenged its settlement, James Hardie 
demonstrates the constraints that directors’ duties impose on directors and their 
uncertainty. 
 
4 Australian Directors’ Understanding of Their Duties 
A survey of the practices and understanding of Australian directors indicates 
a discrepancy between legal norms and director practice.57 A majority of 
respondent directors indicated that they understood that their primary obligation 
to act in the best interests of the company required them to balance the interests 
of all stakeholders (55 per cent). A further 38.2 per cent equated ‘the best 
                                                 
54  Woolworths Ltd v Kelly (1991) 22 NSWLR, 226 (corporate generosity ‘only if, essentially, it be for the 
benefit or for the purposes of the company’). 
55  Senate Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs, Parliament of Australia, Company 
Directors’ Duties: Report on the Social and Fiduciary Duties and Obligations of Company Directors 
(1989) 83 [6.3]. 
56  Richard Mitchell, Anthony O’Donnell and Ian Ramsay, ‘Shareholder Value and Employee Interests: 
Intersections between Corporate Governance, Corporate Law and Labour Law’ (2005) 23 Wisconsin 
International Law Journal 417, 437. 
57  Malcolm Anderson et al, ‘Evaluating the Shareholder Primacy Theory: Evidence from a Survey of 
Australian Directors’ (Legal Studies Research Report No 302, University of Melbourne, 2007) 10–11.  
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interests of the company’ with the interests of all stakeholders as a means of 
ensuring the long-term interests of shareholders. Only a very small proportion 
(6.6 per cent) believed that they were required to act in the long-term interests of 
shareholders only. Nearly all directors (94.3 per cent) believed that the law on 
directors’ duties is broad enough to allow them to take the interests of 
stakeholders other than shareholders into account.  
The beliefs of the two largest respondent groups as to the legitimate place of 
stakeholder interests are not supported by legal doctrine unless their views are 
qualified by assuming derivative corporate benefit, a tortured construction. At 
first blush, this data suggests that the law on directors’ duties is not having an 
inhibiting effect on social responsiveness. Rather, it has no influence at all upon 
director conduct which is more likely shaped by business imperatives and social 
and ethical norms. Certainly, the data indicates ambiguity amongst directors as to 
the permissible scope of their duties. In larger decisions involving profit sacrifice 
without clear prospect of equivalent corporate benefit, taken with legal advice, 
the inhibiting effect is more obvious. James Hardie is the exemplar. 
 
5 Assessing the Australian Licence for Corporate Responsibility through 
Directors’ Duties 
The James Hardie incident generated two inquiries into directors’ duties and 
corporate social responsibility. The reports from both inquiries encouraged 
directors to incorporate social concerns into decision-making but considered that 
this is already permitted under Australian law. Both inquiries preferred social 
protection to be effected through targeted legislation outside corporate law. Both 
committees preferred an approach which they called ‘enlightened self-interest’. 
To the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Corporations and Financial Services, 
this meant that ‘directors may consider and act upon the legitimate interests of 
stakeholders to the extent that those interests are relevant to the corporation.’58 
The Corporations and Markets Advisory Committee (‘CAMAC’) would permit 
stakeholder accommodation which is likely to be in the company’s own 
commercial interest as part of a strategy to maximise shareholder value over the 
long-term.59 Both reflect the Australian legal consensus on the issue.  
 
(a) The Litigation Process is Unlikely to Deliver Suitable Cases for Rule 
Elaboration in Australia  
CAMAC thought that ‘the courts, through their interpretation of the law … 
can assist in aligning corporate behaviour with changing community 
expectations.’60 This seems an excessively benign view of the past influence and 
future prospects of judicial regulation of corporate social responsiveness through 
directors’ duties. That is no reproach of the courts but recognition of the realities 
                                                 
58  Parliamentary Joint Committee on Corporations and Financial Services, Parliament of Australia, 
Corporate Responsibility: Managing Risk and Creating Value (2006) 52–3 [4.32], [4.39]. 
59  Social Responsibility of Corporations Report, above n 31, 77–9 [2.5]. 
60  Ibid, 111–13 [3.12]. 
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that drive litigation. Most Australian decisions on the duty to act in the interests 
of the company have arisen in internal contests for corporate control and have not 
raised any question of stakeholder interests. Privative provisions were inserted 
into the Corporations Act in 2000 which oust the jurisdiction of courts in 
takeover disputes during the bid period (section 659B(1)), effectively stifling this 
path for rule development. In any event, CSR issues are by their nature not 
readily litigated. Shareholders do not have any formal power to force directors to 
take such initiatives because of the immunity directors enjoy from shareholder 
direction.61 Further, it is difficult to see grounds for individual shareholder suit to 
compel board or management action. Effectively then, shareholder remedies exist 
only for the restraint of CSR action, by those who, as in Parke v Daily News, 
oppose decisions taken in response to stakeholder interests. Even here, 
information asymmetry and rational apathy militate against litigation initiative, 
especially since the benefits of a successful derivative suit are shared but the 
burdens are individual. The need for judicial approval for suit under the statutory 
derivative procedure introduced in 2000 is a further obstacle to shareholder suit. 
As a reform strategy, waiting for judicial resolution and renewal of these 
questions in Australia pits hope against long experience.  
 
(b) Lack of Rule Clarity and Guidance for Directors  
Even beyond these judicial process considerations, there are substantive 
flaws in the body of directors’ duties as regulator of director discretion in 
responding to wider responsibilities. These result in lack of guidance as to the 
scope of director licence and the principles that should shape its exercise. The 
lack of guidance results in uncertain director protection and weakens incentives 
for corporate social responsiveness. Legal doctrines governing the discretion are 
poorly resolved, for example, as to whether and to what extent the interests of the 
company as a commercial entity may influence recognition of external claims. 
Where interests other than those of members are involved, conceptualising ‘the 
company’ as enterprise rather than simply as membership recognises the wider 
interests that are implicated in business success.62 Looking only through the lens 
of current shareholder interest misses the time and institutional dimensions of 
enterprise.  
Second, the Australian consensus assumes a nexus between corporate social 
expenditure and corporate advantage that is not grounded in clear doctrinal 
authority and lacks clarity as to character and quantum, whether of parity, 
proportionality or simply some derivative albeit disproportionate benefit. The 
assumption is also made that courts possess the institutional capacity to quantify, 
and weigh against the more readily calculable cost outlays, long-term future 
benefits of CSR measures such as reputational gains or avoidance of reputational 
damage. The nexus requirement precludes corporate response that involves net 
                                                 
61  Automatic Self-Cleansing Filter Syndicate Company Ltd v Cuninghame [1906] 2 Ch 34. 
62  L S Sealy, ‘Directors’ “Wider” Responsibilities – Problems Conceptual, Practical and Procedural’ (1987) 
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profit sacrifice, that is, outlays that exceed demonstrable corporate benefit. Its 
effect is also to inhibit corporate responses that are not comfortably supported by 
a plausible business case. This is a negative consequence since ‘it is implausible 
to think that all socially beneficial corporate conduct conveniently happens to be 
profit-maximizing.’63 James Hardie’s lengthy refusal, upon legal advice, to 
contribute to asbestos claims exemplifies the baleful effect of this inhibition.  
Third, while the case law generally identifies the interests of the company 
with the collective shareholder interest, it does not specify that the interest must 
be a financial interest solely or primarily as the nexus with corporate benefit.64 
Shareholders also have social preferences that affect their interests as investors 
including the satisfaction derived from enterprise activities. For pension and 
endowment funds and socially responsible investors in particular, investment is 
likely to have an important social dimension which is elided by focus on 
financial wellbeing only.  
Fourth, the Australian legal consensus takes a narrow view of the regulatory 
forces shaping corporate conduct. It takes no account of the social norms and 
sanctions that moderate human behaviour generally. The restrictive licence for 
directors to respond to social norms inhibits their beneficial effect on corporate 
behaviour and arguably diminishes shareholder welfare. This consideration is 
explored in the next following part. 
 
IV   LEGISLATING TO LICENSE, AND SPECIFY THE 
PERMISSIBLE SCOPE OF, STAKEHOLDER 
ACCOMMODATION  
What options are available to provide clearer guidance, encouragement and 
protection to directors minded to respond to social expectations upon their firms? 
A legal obligation might be imposed on directors to maximise corporate profits 
and shareholder wealth. However, none of the principal legal systems adopts 
such a legal norm which would be antithetical to long standing traditions of 
judicial deference to disinterested and informed business judgment. A 
diametrically opposed option is to require directors to have regard to the interests 
of shareholders and other stakeholders. These two options raise the larger 
question whether according primacy to shareholder or to stakeholder interests 
generally maximises aggregate social welfare, an issue beyond the scope of this 
article. Instead, three modest proposals are briefly sketched in this and the next 
two parts. Each more or less assumes the continuing primacy of shareholder 
interests.  
The first option is for a statutory provision permitting (but not requiring) 
directors to respond to social expectations and norms and have regard to 
                                                 
63  Einer Elhauge, ‘Sacrificing Corporate Profits in the Public interest’ (2005) 80 New York University Law 
Review 733, 745. 
64  See also Social Responsibility of Corporations Report, above n 31, 84–9 [3.2]. 
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stakeholder interests. The option would grant an explicit discretion for directors 
to sacrifice profits in the exercise of their business judgment as to the best 
interests of the company. In many cases, that sacrifice will be supported by a 
plausible ‘business case’ of net corporate benefit. The option’s utility is that it 
would permit director discretion to respect and respond to social norms and 
expectations as to responsible conduct without putting directors to ex post proof 
of net tangible corporate benefit under the business case. The James Hardie 
experience indicates the inhibiting thrall that the prospect of such justification in 
a forensic context casts upon directors. The fuzziness and uncertainty of the 
current law’s exactions aggravate the inhibition. Of course, the option assumes 
that the exercise of discretion is untainted by material personal interest on the 
part of directors.  
A majority of states in the United States grant directors discretion to promote 
stakeholder interests. ‘Constituency’ statutes have been enacted permitting, but 
generally not requiring, directors to consider the interests of other corporate 
constituencies such as employees, customers, suppliers, creditors, the community 
and society at large in deciding what is in the best interests of the corporation; 
most are not limited to responses to hostile takeovers but apply to any 
management decision.65 Some statutes say that directors are not required to give 
primacy to any particular set of interests; some explicitly permit profit sacrifice. 
All assume that directors will use their business judgment in determining the 
weight to be given to particular stakeholder interests. Although it is sometimes 
argued that these statutes permit stakeholder regard only to the extent that doing 
so promotes long-term profitability, the better view appears to be that the licence 
is not so constrained.66 The statutes do not give non-shareholder stakeholders 
standing to take enforcement action against directors for breach of duty and make 
no special provision for representation of their interests in corporate 
governance.67 Even in those states like Delaware that do not have such a statute, 
the courts have recognised broad director discretion to have regard for the 
interests of non-shareholders even when not profit enhancing.68  
 
A   Recognising that the Beneficial Effect of Social Norms and Sanctions 
Improves Corporate Behaviour 
Two principal arguments support such an explicit discretion to sacrifice 
profits. The first is that such discretion improves corporate behaviour by 
promoting responsiveness to social norms and sanctions that are beneficial 
moderators of conduct. In corporate firms these norms bear upon directors rather 
                                                 
65  The American Law Institute, Principles of Corporate Governance: Analysis and Recommendations 
(American Law Institute, 1994) vol 1, 75 (‘Principles of Corporate Governance’); For a summary of 
constituency statutes, see Kathleen Hale, ‘Corporate Law and Stakeholders: Moving Beyond Stakeholder 
Statutes’ (2003) 45 Arizona Law Review 823. 
66  Elhauge, above n 63, 766–7. 
67  See Corporations and Markets Advisory Committee, Parliament of Australia, Corporate Social 
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than shareholders; enabling directors to respond by explicit discretion allows 
these norms fuller play. The drivers of human behaviour include the social norms 
of the communities in which we live (that is, the rules and practices that shape 
daily life but are not expressed in legal norms), the informal sanctions that 
accompany their breach and the personal impulses shaped by the moral compass 
within each of us. The regulation of human behaviour by law relies for its 
effectiveness upon these complementary norms and impulses: ‘optimal regulation 
of behaviour has always required supplementing necessarily imperfect legal 
sanctions with social sanctions and internalized moral norms.’69 Indeed, 
‘imperfect legal sanctions are in fact optimal’70 since ‘under inclusion cannot be 
eliminated without increasing the over inclusion of desirable conduct.’71  
The Australian inquiries into directors’ duties and corporate social 
responsibility proceeded with a narrow focus upon law and markets as the 
primary or sole regulators of corporate behaviour. Corporations operate, 
however, in a complex milieu of social norms, expectations and sanctions that 
can be powerful moderators of conduct. Consider first the impact of norms on 
directors themselves. The dramatic elevation of standards of care among 
company directors evident in the United States after the hostile takeover boom of 
the 1980s appears explicable not in terms of changing legal rules (which largely 
relaxed director obligation) but of changing social norms among directors as to 
the obligations assumed with directorial office. That shift in turn reflected a 
changed belief system among directors prompted by their recognition of the 
degree of management slack that permitted takeover offers with bid premiums of 
50 per cent above market price.72 The web of social norms is even greater for 
firms themselves. As noted in Part II, corporations are subject to multiple social 
norms, expectations and sanctions with respect to responsible conduct that go 
well beyond their legal obligations. This is especially so under economic 
globalisation where host state incapacity and home state unwillingness to 
regulate offshore activities leave much regulation of corporate conduct to social 
norms.  
Two peculiarities of corporate structure insulate shareholders from the impact 
of social norms and make it important to preserve director discretion to respond 
to their impulse and sanctions. In publicly held companies without a controlling 
shareholder, shareholders are distant from enterprise operations. Sanctions for 
norm breach fall instead upon directors and managers responsible for or 
associated with offending conduct. Second, the scale of information asymmetry 
between directors and shareholders, and the collective action problems that deter 
close monitoring and intervention, further distance shareholders from social 
sanctions and the knowledge that is a prerequisite to moral responsibility. If 
social and moral norms are to have their beneficial effect within corporate firms, 
                                                 
69  Elhauge, above n 63, 740.  
70  Ibid 748. 
71  Ibid 740.  
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directors need some discretion to respond to them including by appropriate profit 
sacrifice if necessary.  
 
B   It May be in Shareholders’ Interests to Permit Directors the Discretion to 
Sacrifice Profits to Comply with Social Norms and Expectations 
A second argument is that director discretion to sacrifice profits enlarges 
aggregate shareholder welfare since it enables the firm to engage in dealings that 
generate trust and exchange that are not conditioned upon discrete transaction 
advantage. Elhauge argues that a ‘social understanding that actors are likely to 
comply with social and moral norms … leads to a social reciprocity that is profit-
maximizing for each actor.’73 It is the very prospect that the corporation will 
engage in profit sacrificing that encourages those with whom it deals to treat it 
liberally in anticipation of future reciprocal benefit. If, however, directors are 
denied discretion to sacrifice profits in business dealings, the firm will be 
excluded from otherwise beneficial exchanges. Elhauge’s conclusion on 
aggregate shareholder welfare is persuasive where it may be assumed that 
managers represent the views of a majority of shareholders in the decision to 
sacrifice profits, especially where those views are confirmed by shareholder 
resolution.74 The position with respect to aggregate shareholder welfare in other 
circumstances is less easily demonstrated. 
 
C   Protective Limits to Discretion to Sacrifice Profits 
All power needs be held to account. Several limiting devices are available to 
police the exercise of discretion to sacrifice profits including devices grounded in 
reasonableness (as to the quantum of profit sacrifice involved or its relation to 
projected benefits), rational benefit to shareholders, and connection to the 
company’s business (a measure adopted in the ex gratia employee benefits cases, 
above at p 327).75 The American Law Institute’s Principles of Corporate 
Governance permit the allocation of corporate resources for social considerations 
such as public welfare, humanitarian, educational and philanthropic purposes 
without a showing of expected profits or compliance with ethical norms; 
however, a reasonableness test is imposed which depends on all the 
circumstances of the case with the principal factors to be considered being ‘the 
customary level at which resources are devoted to such purposes among 
comparable corporations in proportion to earnings and assets, and the strength of 
the nexus between the use of corporate resources and the corporation’s 
business’.76 Another protective limit might require justification in terms of 
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widely accepted soft law standards under human rights or voluntary instrument. 
Proposing such a pre-condition, however, assumes the crystallisation of such a 
standard for every situation; it is not clear that a specific standard was available 
to guide the James Hardie board in their decisions about the foundation’s funding 
from 2001. There is the further difficulty that existing soft law standards often do 
not address the responsibility of parent companies for conduct by subsidiaries, 
affiliates and suppliers in its global value chain. That issue was, of course, also at 
the core of the legal and ethical choice for the Hardie board. 
 
D   Some Objections to an Explicit Licence to Sacrifice Profits 
Two critiques might most strongly be made about the proposed licence, one 
that it weakens director accountability to shareholders and the other that it is 
likely to have limited or no effect in view of the social norms shared by directors 
as to their role and responsibilities and the structure of the incentives driving 
their conduct. The critiques are, of course, antinomic. 
 
1 Enlarging Discretion is at the Cost of Director Accountability  
A Senate committee in 1989 rejected a formalised discretion in directors to 
have regard for outside interests in their own right on the basis that it would 
weaken ‘shareholders’ ability to bring directors to account for failing to act in the 
interests of the company’.77 However, a permissive provision need not 
necessarily weaken director accountability – much depends on the protective 
limits adopted to preserve scope for judicial review (see above, text 
accompanying nn 71–3). The absence of clear doctrinal differences in the United 
States between ‘constituency’ states and others such as Delaware indicates that 
permissive statutory provisions need not involve the surrender of judicial control 
nor undermine the tradition of judicial deference to disinterested and informed 
business judgment. Further, this objection assumes that accountability to 
shareholders should trump other forms of accountability and responsiveness. 
 
2 Limited Practical Impact?  
The contrary critique is that United States experience suggests that such a 
reform is unlikely to have a significant impact on director practice.78 That 
concern reflects the influence of social norms among directors that corporate 
profit and shareholder value are the key performance measures. These norms are 
reinforced by incentive systems especially the structure of executive 
remuneration, the increasing use of share options and shareholder value metrics 
generally. The focus on shareholder value is bolstered by the performance 
incentives upon fund managers competing for investment mandates from 
institutional investors and, for directors and managers, the constant threat of a 
                                                 
77  Senate Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs, above n 55, 96 [6.44]. 
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hostile takeover bid should share price fall.79 These are formidable forces. Yet, 
the rationale for a permissive provision is not the radical overhaul of corporate 
culture but the modest one of opening that culture to the wholesome influence of 
social norms and sanctions that moderate human behaviour generally.80 
 
V   REQUIRING DIRECTORS TO CONSIDER STAKEHOLDERS 
IN SHAREHOLDERS’ INTEREST 
A second reform option is a statutory provision such as that adopted in the 
United Kingdom Companies Act 2006 that requires directors to have regard to 
specified stakeholder interests and social impacts in discharging their duty to 
promote shareholder welfare. This ‘enlightened shareholder value’ approach 
reflected concerns that shareholder primacy, especially in an active takeover 
market, might place directors under pressure to focus narrowly on short-term 
shareholder interests at the expense of the longer term value of the enterprise to 
shareholders.81 The review found evidence that ‘the obligation to look beyond the 
short term was not widely recognised by directors or members.’82 The solution it 
proposed retained the primacy of shareholder interests but adopted an ‘inclusive’ 
approach to the reformulation of directors’ duties that seeks to cultivate 
cooperative relationships with other participants. A second element of its 
approach was to require disclosure of the value of those relationships to 
shareholders. The two elements are ‘mutually reinforcing’.83 
The formulation of duty follows the traditional expression in terms of the 
collective shareholder interest: ‘[a] director of a company must act in the way 
that he considers, in good faith, would be most likely to promote the success of 
the company for the benefit of its members as a whole’.84 The enlightened 
shareholder value approach refines this duty by requiring the director to ‘have 
regard, (amongst other matters)’ to the long-term consequences of business 
decisions, the company’s reputation for standards of business conduct and the 
impact of decisions on employees, on its business relationships with suppliers 
and customers, and on the community and environment: Companies Act 2006 
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(UK) section 172(1). The duty is owed to the company: Companies Act 2006 
(UK) section 170(1). Only the company may enforce breach of duty although a 
shareholder may bring a derivative action in the company’s interest in certain 
circumstances. 
This approach addresses the problem of indeterminate decision-making 
criteria by privileging the collective shareholder interest over that of other 
stakeholders but only after directors consider the consequences of the decision 
for those interests. Consideration of non-shareholder interests is instrumental in 
that those interests are considered only to the extent that they promote 
shareholder interests. Where the impact on stakeholders is negative it is not, as in 
multi-fiduciary stakeholder models, weighed directly against shareholder benefit. 
‘The weight to be given to particular matters will remain a matter for the 
judgment of the directors.’85 The enlightenment in this model of shareholder 
value lies in the forced scanning of stakeholder impact for the purpose of 
extracting maximum shareholder advantage in corporate decision-making. The 
model might more accurately be called enhanced shareholder value, or 
enlightened self-interest, since its purpose in requiring directors to pay regard to 
impacts on other stakeholder relationships is to ensure that the negative effect of 
these impacts is not overlooked in the calculation of shareholder advantage. A 
company that is attentive to these interests, relationships and impacts is more 
likely to maximise profit and shareholder value.  
The model has the advantage of legitimising current good board practice, 
‘namely far-sighted managers considering the interests of non-shareholder 
stakeholders so far as it fosters corporate profits.’86 It creates an environment in 
which directors can make decisions that respect social norms and human rights 
with greater assurance that they are not exposing themselves to suit in doing so. 
It guides directors in what they should consider and respects their business 
judgment as to what will best promote the success of the company. The 
explicitness of the provision offers in a shorthand form guidance otherwise 
locked away in legal texts and decisions.  
Both of the James Hardie-inspired Australian reviews declined to follow this 
model. CAMAC considered that since courts ‘can assist in aligning corporate 
behaviour with changing community expectations … no worthwhile benefit is to 
be gained’ from the provision.87 The Parliamentary Joint Committee thought that 
the provision ‘introduce[d] great uncertainty into the legal expression of 
directors’ duties … and therefore gives no guidance to directors on what they 
must do in order to comply’.88 Curiously, these grounds posit as virtues what are 
in truth the central weaknesses of Australian law in this area – the absence of 
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modern decision on the question and the resulting lack of guidance to directors 
(see above, p 330).  
This measure differs from the first reform option both in its retention of the 
traditional identification of company interests with those of shareholders and the 
mandatory character of its requirement, namely, to scan for stakeholder impacts. 
While the specified stakeholder interests include many that are important to 
business success, they are not framed by reference to the universe of norms 
applying to business. For example, they do not include the corporate 
responsibility to respect human rights elaborated just two years after the United 
Kingdom provision was enacted. If specific stakeholder interests are identified, 
even inclusively as in the United Kingdom provision, this risks ossifying the 
range of norms and sanctions that may legitimately be considered, especially in a 
time of rapid rule elaboration.  
 
VI   A SAFE HARBOUR FOR BUSINESS JUDGMENTS 
RESPONDING TO SOCIAL NORMS AND EXPECTATIONS 
A third option is to create a safe harbour from liability for directors’ business 
judgments taken in response to social norms and expectation. United States 
courts have created a business judgement rule which operates as a presumption or 
burden of proof issue, requiring a shareholder who seeks to bring a derivative suit 
for breach of duty to establish first that one of the conditions to which the 
protection of the rule is subject has not been satisfied. The presumption is that 
disinterested directors make business decisions on an informed basis and with the 
good faith belief that their decision will best promote the company’s interests; a 
person challenging the conduct of a director for breach of the duty of care (which 
includes the United States counterpart to the duty to act in the best interests of the 
company) has the threshold burden of displacing the presumption by showing 
that the director either had a personal interest, was insufficiently informed or 
lacked a rational belief that the business judgment was in the best interests of the 
company.89 The business judgment rule gives directors considerable latitude to 
make both profit-enhancing and profit-sacrificing decisions.  
A business judgement rule was introduced by statute in Australia in 2000 but 
applies only to the director’s duty of care and not the duty to act in company 
interests.90 The Australian reform proposal was based upon the United States 
business judgment rule as restated by the American Law Institute; it sought to 
provide ‘an explicit safe harbour for directors, such that they would know with 
some certainty that, if they fulfilled the requirements [of the presumption], they 
                                                 
89  The American Law Institute, above n 65, 134–5. 
90  Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 180. 
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would effectively be shielded from liability for breach of their duty of care’.91 
The enacted provision has, however, been interpreted to operate only as a 
defence to an action for breach and not, as in the United States, a threshold 
obstacle to the commencement of shareholder suit.92  
There is merit in a statutory rule that would apply to the director’s duty to act 
in the interests of the company with a view to promoting corporate social 
responsiveness. To achieve its protective purpose, it would need to be framed so 
as to operate as a threshold protective presumption and not as a defence to be 
raised in a substantive action. Under this option directors would be protected 
from suit for breach of duty in responding to stakeholder claims and social 
expectations unless a plaintiff first establishes the absence of one of the elements 
of the presumption. The first two elements of the presumption – personal interest 
in or insufficiency of information with respect to the business judgment – are 
unproblematic; the third needs be refined if the harbour is truly to offer safety for 
directors. To require rational belief as to corporate benefit would undermine the 
goal of encouraging director responsiveness to social expectation and 
responsibilities for human rights and other social impacts: the purpose of safe 
harbour is to protect directors against the risk that socially responsive decisions 
ultimately prove profit-sacrificing. This consideration suggests that the measure 
might best operate in conjunction with an explicit statutory licence to consider 
stakeholder interests under the first option (see above, Part IV) and that the 
rational belief test needs be recast, either in terms of the feasible long-term 
reputational and other benefits to the company or by reference to the broad 
legitimacy of the social norms, human rights or other standard by reference to 
which the board acts.  
 
VII   CONCLUSION  
A quarter-century ago a distinguished scholar concluded that ‘company law 
(at least as it stands, but probably in any form it could potentially take) must 
acknowledge that it has no mechanism to ensure the fulfillment of obligations of 
social responsibility.’93 While this pessimism may prove well founded as far as 
‘ensured’ fulfillment is concerned, it should not discourage attempts to remove 
unnecessary obstacles. This article shows that gaps in the Australian law on 
directors’ duties result in poor guidance to directors on their proper response to 
social expectation and stakeholder claim, discourage corporate social 
                                                 
91  Corporate Law Economic Reform Program, ‘Directors’ Duties and Corporate Governance: Facilitating 
Innovation and Protecting Investors’ (Proposals for Reform Paper No 3, Corporate Law Economic 
Reform Program, 1997) 28; See also Explanatory Memorandum, Corporate Law Economic Reform 
Program Bill 1998 (Cth) 18 [6.9]. 
92  See, eg, Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Rich (2009) 236 FLR 1, 146–50 [7258]–
[7270].  
93  Sealy, above n 62, 176.  
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responsibility initiatives and deny directors the clarity of protection from liability 
that they are entitled to expect.  
The past quarter-century has seen the extraordinary efflorescence of 
corporate social responsibility standards and norms of responsibility for human 
rights impacts of business operations and relationships. These soft law 
developments respond to the emergence of the global economy and the 
weakening of nation state capacity and incentive to address ‘the governance gaps 
created by globalization – between the scope and impact of economic forces and 
actors, and the capacity of societies to manage their adverse consequences.’94 The 
implications of this new civil regulation for corporate law and practice ‘remain 
poorly understood’ by business, especially the legitimate boundaries of director 
responsiveness to wider norms and expectations of conduct. The James Hardie 
imbroglio points to the dangers when directors’ duties stand in the way of 
responsiveness to social norms of corporate responsibility and proper conduct.  
The article sketches three options to promote director and manager 
responsiveness to norms to which long-term shareholder value and non-financial 
risk management are hostage in the global economy. Effectively, these resolve 
into a choice between two reform models. The first, statutory permission for 
directors to weigh stakeholder interests against those of shareholders, faces 
entrenched social norms among directors that define the corporate objective and 
success measures in terms of shareholder value; executive remuneration and 
financial market incentives reinforce these group norms and bias the time horizon 
towards the short-term. Such a statutory provision permits but only modestly 
promotes social norm responsiveness; its incentives, however, are strengthened if 
it were combined with a statutory safe harbour for board decisions taken in 
response to social norms. The second model is the United Kingdom recasting of 
the director’s duty to act in the company interests in terms of promoting 
shareholder welfare through mandatory ‘enlightened’ scanning of stakeholder 
impacts for their effect on shareholder value. Neither model is flawless; each 
warrants closer study. 
 
 
                                                 
94  Business and Human Rights Report, above n 22, 3 [3]. 
